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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE EMERGENT RIGHT TO WATER 
 
 
In recent years there has been an emergence of a critical scholarship within the social 
sciences – particularly in the field of political philosophy and law – which has sought to 
bring to attention, or to forefront, that which is excluded from mainstream discourse or 
standard narratives.  The sense of this scholarship is not merely to observe the point at 
which law ends and politics begins, or to identify the limits of any linguistic 
representation (and hence the limits of any hermeneutic endeavour), but to reflect upon 
the way in which that those peoples, ideas, situations or events which are excluded from 
the discourse in question, may paradoxically come to represent its raison d’etre.  The first 
person to employ this idea in the context of human rights, of course, was Hannah 
Arendt, whose blistering critique of the rights of man was founded upon the idea that the 
quality of being ‘human’ for such purposes was reduced to a condition of savagery at the 
point at which the enjoyment of rights became dependent upon membership in a 
political society – a move which, of course, not only excluded those who were stateless 
but also, in doing so, rendered more problematic the basis of the emergent political 
order.1   Rather than view the stateless in Europe as the hapless minority who were yet to 
enjoy the protection of human rights, she was to take their position as representative of 
what it meant to be a human for purposes of claiming or demanding human rights.  And 
in the sense that the business of human rights advocacy remains dependent upon the 
identification of those who continue to suffer physically, or by dispossession (those who 
may be killed, and yet not sacrificed to use Agamben’s evocative phrase2), her point is 
surely still a perceptive one. 
 
In line with this contemporaneous concern with the exception, or with the ‘dark-side’ of 
legal rule, I would like to reflect upon the significance of two ‘absences’ in the emerging 
debate surrounding the right to water.  The first concerns the absence within 
authoritative texts (particularly the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights) of any express reference to water as a human right.  The second 
concerns the absence, or perhaps ‘set of absences’ within the United Nations Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ elucidation of the right to water in its General 
Comment No. 15 of 2002.3 
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 Before engaging directly with each of these, it may be useful to reflect briefly upon what 
‘an absence’ might entail, and the point at which an absence seems to represent an 
exclusion in the sense articulated by Arendt.  In its literal sense, an absence would appear 
to merely signify ‘being away’ (deriving from the Latin ab-esse), but of course the 
condition of ‘being away’ may speak of several different kinds of experience.   One might 
be as the ‘absence of a friend’ – an absence brought about, perhaps, through loss, 
accident, or extenuating circumstances – whose characteristic determinant is perhaps a 
desire for presence, or the recognition that the absence itself constitutes a loss of some 
kind.  This may be called, for present purposes, an ‘inclusionary absence’.4 Another, 
contrasting, form of absence might be the ‘absent other’ – an absence of someone or 
something whose presence is neither desired nor necessary, but whose existence has 
nevertheless been recognised.  The physical dislocation of that which is absent (being 
away) corresponds here to an emotional, social or political dissociation between that 
which is present and that which is not.  The absence, here, constitutes not a loss, but an 
affirmation of what is not included, and may be referred to, in that sense, as an 
‘exclusionary absence’.5  A third form of absence is one in which the presence of the 
person or thing which is ‘not there’ is neither desired nor opposed in the senses of either 
an inclusionary or exclusionary absence, but results simply from a lack of cognition/ 
recognition.  The absence here speaks more of an ‘absence of mind’ in the sense that had 
some thought been given to the matter, some positive decision to include or exclude 
might have been made, and that it was only at some later date that the issue of ‘non-
presence’ came to assume some prominence.  All forms of absence seem to be premised 
upon the relationship between ‘being’ (in an ontological or epistemological sense) and 
intention: that which is absent serving to define or constitute that which is not. 
 
How then, might this typology of absence relate to the issues I have raised concerning 
the right to water? 
 
1. Interpretive Ambivalence: A Human Right to Water? 
In recent debates concerning the right to water, much is usually made of the fact that the 
right to water finds no explicit recognition within any of the major human rights 
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instruments – with the exception, perhaps, of article 14(2) of CEDAW.  There is no 
mention, for example, of a human right to water in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  None either in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.  Where the latter speaks of right to an adequate standard of living, furthermore, 
mention is made of ‘adequate food, clothing and housing’, but not of water – an absence 
which in the present context appears rather startling.  Despite the disquieting silence of 
major human rights agreements on the topic, the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in its General Comment No. 15 (2002) reaffirmed in explicit terms 
that which was already implicit in much of its earlier work – namely that there existed 
under the terms of the UN Covenant, a right of access to adequate drinking water and 
sanitation as part and parcel of the more general right to an adequate standard of living in 
article 11. 
 
This creative affirmation did not go entirely unnoticed.  In a subsequent debate within 
the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2003, the Canadian representative (Gregson) 
took a stand against the UN Committee’s pronouncements.  He suggested that: 
‘While accepting that governments owed a responsibility to their own people to 
provide access to a clean drinking water supply and sanitation, it did not agree 
that there was a “right” to drinking water and sanitation owed between states.  
The internationalization of a right to water between states was not grounded 
on any plausible reading of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and was therefore opposed by his government.’6 
As far as the Canadian government was concerned, then, the silence of the Covenant on 
the issue of water was deafening – it could not plausibly be maintained that the Covenant 
in any way recognised a right to water and the UN Committee’s intimations to that effect 
were effectively misplaced.  Its remarks in that direction, however, were subtle.  It merely 
denied the existence of ‘international’ obligations ‘between states’, rather than the 
existence of a responsibility on the part of governments to their own people for the 
provision of clean drinking water.  It did not deny, for that purpose, that individuals or 
communities within Canada or elsewhere might legitimately campaign for the protection 
of their right to water, but merely denied that this right was afforded international 
protection under the terms of the UN Covenant.  This was not, thus, a trenchant 
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rejection of the idea of a right to water, but a rejection of its ‘internationalisation’ through 
a ‘misreading’ of the terms of the Covenant. 
 
On the surface, the Canadian opposition to the position adopted by the UN Committee 
may be understood as turning upon a rival interpretive strategy.  Whereas the UN 
Committee had clearly taken the view that the ‘right to an adequate standard of living’ 
could not be fully comprehended without some attention being directed to the issue of 
access to water, and hence had pursued what might be called a ‘teleological’ or 
‘purposive’ approach to interpretation, Canada by contrast, insisted upon a narrow 
‘literalist’ construction that denied the existence of any rights or obligations that were not 
explicitly mentioned in the text itself.  To put in terms of the typology of absence 
described above, whilst Canada saw the absence of a right to water as an ‘exclusionary 
absence’, the Committee understood it to have resulted from a lack of cognition during 
the drafting of the Covenant of the potential significance of access to water for purposes 
of ensuring an adequate standard of living (an absence of mind), which thus could be 
treated as an essentially ‘inclusionary absence’. 
 
See as a debate over the enduring significance of original intent, the debate does not go 
very far.  The absence of evidence from the drafting record (travaux preparatoires) as to 
the significance of the original omission of reference to water in the Covenant, neither 
confirms nor denies the Canadian position (or indeed that of the Committee).  For its 
part, no doubt, the Committee would insist that, in line with the interpretive strategies of 
other human rights bodies, the adoption of a ‘teleological’ or ‘evolutive’ approach to 
interpretation is more a ‘progressive’ or ‘legitimate’ approach to the interpretation of the 
Covenant, particularly given the Committee’s emphasis upon securing the position of the 
marginalised or disempowered within society.  Canada, for its part, would probably insist 
that since the Covenant is an international agreement, it is for states parties to construe 
its terms (not a Committee lacking even quasi-judicial powers) and that respect for the 
principles of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction demand that the boundaries of 
legitimate interpretation be closely construed by reference to what is there in the text, 
rather than by what is not.   
 
But, of course, such interpretive strategies are heavily context-dependent.  To take a 
separate example, the omission from the Covenant of any clause limiting States 
obligations to actions or omissions taken within their respective ‘jurisdiction’, has given 
rise to controversy as regards the extent of States’ ‘international’ or ‘exterritorial 
obligations’ under the Covenant.7  Canada, together with several other Western States, 
has largely opposed any reading of the Covenant that may indicate the existence of 
‘transnational’ obligations, and has done so on the basis that the omission must be read 
in light of a background presumption – namely that obligations under treaties of this 
kind are primarily territorial in character.8   Its position, in other words, reprises the 
position adopted by the UN Committee in respect of water – had the drafters of the 
Covenant realised the significance of the issue they would have inserted a clause 
(including the right to water/ excluding extraterritoriality) to that effect.  The position of 
the Committee by contrast, has been to emphasise the clauses on international 
cooperation interspersed within various articles of the Covenant and has employed, in 
that sense, a largely literal construction of the agreement. 
 
It is clear, in that respect, that different modes of interpretation do not neatly align 
themselves by reference to ‘conservative’ or ‘progressive’ traditions in thought.  A desire 
to conserve the status quo may involve occasionally reading an instrument such as the 
Covenant in a ‘teleological’ or ‘evolutive’ manner, just as a desire to transform or change 
social relations may involve reading it ‘literally’.  Governments are as unlikely to insist 
upon one particular mode of interpretation being the only or definitive means by which 
the Covenant is to be construed, as the Committee is to insist upon another.  No mode 
of interpretation is, as such, ‘innately’ better than another from whichever perspective 
one may stand.  What thus becomes far more important in discussions on matters such 
as the right to water, is the background presumptions or imaginings that inform the 
adoption of a particular interpretive strategy – presumptions which may, at their various 
extremes, result in protagonists speaking on different wavelengths, or past, rather than to, 
each other. 
 
The background presumption as articulated by Canada in the quotation above, appears 
to be one in which the Covenant is to be understood above all else, as an inter-state 
agreement that affords a degree of international legal protection to a particular category 
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of human rights.  That it may omit to mention something which might justifiably be 
called a ‘human right’ is neither here nor there, and its invocation of ‘individual rights’ is 
relevant only so far as it may impinge upon the scope of one State’s obligations to 
another.  As far as the Committee is concerned, however, the Covenant seems to be 
viewed in quite a different light.  Far from merely being an agreement which incidentally 
refers to human rights, it is, together with the ICCPR, one of the central pillars of the 
international communities’ human rights project.  An absence or omission from the 
Covenant of a matter such as water is thus far more critical in the sense that it puts in 
question the basis of the project as a whole.  That, for the Committee, it should seek to 
promote the right to an adequate standard of living, but yet ignore the problem of lack of 
access to water, is tantamount to excluding from the Covenant those in whose name the 
Covenant was drafted.  Just as Arendt’s stateless were excluded from the enjoyment of 
human rights when the latter were conflated with the rights of citizens, so also those 
without access to water would become excluded from enjoying the right to an adequate 
standard of living, through the conflation of the latter with access to food, clothing and 
housing, but little else.  Thus whilst the Canadian government took it to be implausible 
to locate a right to water within the terms of the Covenant, it was also evidently 
implausible for the Committee to ignore the issue when engaging with States in 
discussions under the reporting system.   
 
Even if it would have been hard for the Committee to disentangle the right to an 
adequate standard of living from the question of access to water, it might still be objected 
(as, on occasion, has been the case) that the Covenant gives no recognition to a 
‘freestanding’ right to water.  Access to water seems to represent, on this score, an 
interest to be protected, but not a right as such.  The closest analogy to this kind of 
thinking may be represented by the argument, in the context of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, that the European Court occasionally deals with issues 
related to housing or employment and does so not as ‘rights’, but only as legally 
protected interests.  One does not, thus, have a right to housing under the European 
Convention, but only a right to the protection of one’s interest in housing as part and 
parcel of the protection of one’s home, or one’s private or family life under article 8: 
there is no substantive entitlement to housing, merely an incidental guarantee that one’s 
existing legal entitlements or interests should not be arbitrarily interfered with.  As a 
description of the European Court’s approach to the issue of housing under the 
European Convention of Human Rights, this is plausibly accurate enough, but it doesn’t 
fully engage either with the question whether it would be inappropriate to speak of the 
Court, in such circumstances, incidentally protecting an aspect of the right to housing, or 
as to whether it might not also be appropriate for the Court to engage more fully with 
questions concerning the adequacy of housing as part and parcel of a concern to 
promote the right to family life. 
 
Further to this, it is to be observed that the European Court itself has not been entirely 
unwilling to insist upon the existence of what may be called ‘subordinate’ rights as part of 
its interpretive elaboration of more general rights.  In the celebrated Golder case, for 
example, the Court discussed the question whether the right to a fair trial in article 6 of 
the European Convention should be read as guaranteeing, in addition, a right of access 
even in absence of any explicit reference to the latter.  It suggested that: 
‘It would be inconceivable, in the opinion of the Court, that Article 6 para. 1 
(art. 6-1) should describe in detail the procedural guarantees afforded to parties 
in a pending lawsuit and should not first protect that which alone makes it in 
fact possible to benefit from such guarantees, that is, access to a court.  The 
fair, public and expeditious characteristics of judicial proceedings are of no 
value at all if there are no judicial proceedings.’9 
It concluded, therefore, that: 
‘the right of access constitutes an element which is inherent in the right stated 
by Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).  This is not an extensive interpretation forcing 
new obligations on the Contracting States: it is based on the very terms of the 
first sentence of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) read in its context and having regard 
to the object and purpose of the Convention, a lawmaking treaty (see the 
Wemhoff judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 7, p. 23, para. 8), and to 
general principles of law.’10 
Whilst the majority decision in Golder was not without its critics, it is evident that the 
point of discussion concerned the perceived extension of the Convention obligations, 
rather than, and more narrowly, the question whether it would be appropriate to speak of 
the guarantees that were indisputably associated with the right to a fair trial (such as a 
trial within a reasonable time, or a trial before an independent and impartial tribunal) in 
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terms of rights.  It was probably perceived – and this has obvious repercussions as 
regards the claim that the right to water is not ‘freestanding’ – that, so far as there existed 
certain obligations to provide access, there was no real sense in denying its recognition as 
a right. 
 
2. The Politics of an Absence: The UN Committee’s General Comment  
If the UN Committee had taken an unusual step in issuing a General Comment upon a 
topic for which there was no obvious textual referent, the way it approached the right to 
water, was by no means out of line with its established practice.  As with several of its 
earlier General Comments, the Committee employed a standard methodology.  This  
began with an elaboration of the legal basis of the right (articles 11 and 12 of the 
Covenant), moved through an account of its ‘normative content’ (encompassing both 
freedoms and entitlements, and concerned with the availability, quality and accessibility 
of water), the obligations assumed by States (both national and international, positive and 
negative), and illustrative violations (through acts of commission or omission), to a 
discussion of measures to be adopted for purposes of implementation and finally 
obligations assumed by ‘other actors’ such as UN  agencies. 
 
Without going into these elements in detail, there are several features of the Committee’s 
approach to this issue (and indeed most other issues) that are worth highlighting.  First, 
and foremost, the Committee places greatest emphasis upon what it calls the most 
vulnerable and disadvantaged sectors of society – this informs its approach, for example, 
with respect to the identification of ‘minimum core obligations’,11 its emphasis upon 
targeted strategies 12  and its concern with both formal and informal forms of 
discrimination. 13   Secondly, the Committee places considerable emphasis upon 
juridification.  It is particularly concerned, in that regard, with the establishment of 
legislative and/or regulatory frameworks governing access to water,14 and looks for any 
such entitlements as may arise to be underpinned by legal remedies.15  Thirdly, and in line 
with the above two points, the Committee places greatest emphasis upon the role and 
responsibilities of governments, as distinct from other agencies whether public or private, 
in the realisation of rights under the Covenant.   This is not to say that it does not engage 
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at all with obligations of other actors, merely that such obligations assume a peripheral 
character.16 
 
That the Committee has chosen to emphasise these three general points in its general 
comment on the right to water is clearly to imprint discussion of the latter with a certain 
ambience: the issue is one of governmental regulation, legal reform and judicial remedies, 
rather than, and by contrast, detailed policy formulation, project coordination or 
watercourse management.  Alongside the points it does emphasise, therefore, there are 
various points or issues which gain relatively less attention.  Three examples may suffice. 
First of all are environmental factors.  Although the Committee does speak about 
environmental hygiene, the need to monitor aquatic eco-systems, and the obligation on 
States to control pollution of water-systems and assess ‘the impact of actions that may 
impinge upon water availability and natural-ecosystems watersheds, such as climate 
changes, desertification and increased soil salinity, deforestation and loss of 
biodiversity’,17 it clearly does not engage with the full range of causal issues such as 
population growth, industrialisation, urbanisation, or the undermining of traditional 
methods of water management.  Nor, indeed, does the Committee demand anything 
specifically of states in that regard.   
 
Secondly, the Committee does not engage in any serious way with the formulation of 
water policy, or concern itself with water management issues.  As part of its typology of 
obligations, the Committee identifies the obligation to ‘fulfil’ the right to water as 
comprising three elements: to facilitate, promote and provide.  In its subsequent 
description, however, the focus is largely upon the creation of a process of decision-
making, the maintenance of a system of regulation and the elaboration of a check-list for 
policy-makers.  It remains clearly neutral as to whether the delivery of water is through 
public provision or private provision and we remain unclear as to the place from which 
resources for investment/ improvement of infrastructure may come.  How should a 
government seek to extend water provision to rural areas?  To what extent might it 
legitimately impose charges on consumption? How might a government design a 
regulatory scheme that provides room both for inducements for private investment and 
for public guarantees? 
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 Thirdly, and perhaps most understandably, the Committee does not engage with what 
might be called the ‘politics of water’ – such as may found in debates over the 
‘commodification’ of water, water privatisation, or trade.  It is largely unclear as to what 
position the Committee adopts on the question of privatisation (or the variants thereof).  
Are there forms of privatisation that run counter to the obligations under the Covenant? 
Is the notion of a right to water inconsistent with it being regarded as a tradeable 
commodity?  What we do find, here, is a demand for regulation.  Thus, in paragraph 24 
the Committee comments that: ‘[w]here water services… are operated or controlled by 
third parties, States parties must prevent them from compromising equal, affordable, and 
physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable water… [through] an effective 
regulatory system’.  This finds its parallel in the Committee’s discussion of the 
obligations of international agencies involving themselves in water projects, which 
concludes with the rather weak (and perhaps even tautologous) assertion that ‘the 
incorporation of human rights law and principles in the programmes and policies by 
international organizations will greatly facilitate implementation of the right to water’.18 
 
The central feature of the Committee’s approach, in this respect, is its evacuation of the 
domain of policy (or ‘politics’) that sits between the obligation of States, on the one hand, 
to manage water provisioning in an abstract sense, and the right of individuals, on the 
other, to adequate access to water of adequate quality.  Its main role, as has been 
consistently articulated, is to concern itself with outcomes, and questions of due process, 
rather than the substantive process of policy formulation.  Thus, it may engage itself with 
cases in which a government persists in maintaining discriminatory policies, or stands 
back in cases in which it should clearly intervene, but the Committee resists the 
temptation, for example, to decide in advance, that certain policies were inappropriate or 
inadequate in the circumstances, or further than that, simply contrary to the terms of the 
Covenant.   
 
There are three evident considerations, here, that inform the Committee’s approach.  
The first is that it is not a technical committee: it does not have the expertise – whether 
in the form of economists, agronomists, nutritionists, or policy specialists – in order to 
engage with prescriptive policy-making in many of the fields over which it exercises some 
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competence.  Secondly, even if the Committee did have the necessary expertise, the 
formulation of general policies of universal application would simply be inappropriate in 
a context in which lack of access to water arises from multiple and varied sources.  
Thirdly, and perhaps most consciously, the Committee is probably aware that, were it to 
involve itself in such issues, it might be seen to impinge rather too heavily into the sphere 
of domestic politics.  These are matters of ‘sovereign competence’ or ‘domestic 
jurisdiction’ in which a supervisory human rights Committee should not intervene. 
 
The obvious difficulty, of course, is that for all the unwillingness of the Committee to 
engage with politics or operational policy decision-making, that is not such as to prevent 
other significant actors from doing so.  It has not prevented, for example, the World 
Bank from embracing or encouraging the privatisation of water provisioning – in line 
with the Washington, or post-Washington consensus - even if it is somewhat more 
cautious, in that respect, today.  Nor has it prevented the emergence of a small coterie of 
multinational water service providers taking larger and larger control over the delivery of 
water throughout the globe and in the process encouraging, through various international 
agencies, further privatisation as a way of dealing with the growing water crisis.  There is 
in other words a politics going on here, and one that is neither strictly domestic, nor one 
that is necessarily neutral as regards an individual’s access to water. 
 
A curiosity, of course, is that whilst the Committee is keen to resist engaging with the 
process of privatisation - by reason of the ‘political’ nature of the choice – those actors 
engaged in its promotion, tend not to see it as a political issue at all.  For the World Bank, 
the underlying politics (and by politics I mean rival accounts as to the basis for the 
distribution of social resources) is heavily shrouded in a veil of management techniques 
or economic rationality, or simply and more commonly displaced by its appeal to a neo-
Gramscian fiction of ‘state consent’: governments, of course, don’t have to accept a loan 
with the prescribed conditions, it’s simply a question of choice.   Apart from the fact that 
this argument can be run in the opposite direction (if the politics of privatisation has 
been displaced in virtue of a State’s consent to an international loan agreement, so also it 
might be thought to have been displaced by its commitment to economic and social 
rights) it is also clear that this division of labour between law and politics is problematic. 
 
The point I am making is a mercifully simple one.  It is not that privatisation per se is 
wrong, or that the terms of the Covenant commit States to the adoption of a particular 
kind of government, but simply that a blanket refusal to engage with the policies and 
politics of water distribution and management is not to make the Committee’s approach 
any less ‘political’, and that by leaving the matter to other agencies, the Committee may 
actually contribute to the further marginalisation of its main constituency (the poor and 
dispossessed).  In his book Denial and Acknowledgement, Stanley Cohen speaks of 
bystanders as engaging in a politics of denial, in cases in which they seek to rationalise 
their inactivity by either pointing to a diffusion of responsibility, or by justifying that 
inaction by reference an ‘inability to conceive of any form of effective intervention’ (pp. 
32-5).  One might consider, in that respect, that the refusal of the Committee to engage 
more directly with the on-going project of privatisation – on the basis that it does not 
have the responsibility for doing so, or lacks the capacity to do so effectively - may either 
be an indication that it is largely unconcerned as to the effects of the commodification of 
water resources, or that it, perhaps, believes that it is only through privatisation that 
sufficient economic resources may be marshalled in order to deal with the problem.   As 
neither seems to be a plausible explanation, one may sense that the Committee may be 
legislating for its own absence – or excluding its own competence – in the very area in 
which the discussion of water rights is most acute and in which the Committee’s voice is 
perhaps most needed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
